conditions, rather than seeking to minimize the costs of intertemporal tax distortions. For example, a rejection of tax smoothing by state governments, combined with balanced budget rules, suggests that state governments balance budgets annually in response to current conditions.' This could explain the occurrence of state budget crises during times of slow output growth and/or fast expenditure growth. A rejection of tax smoothing by provincial governments might suggest some sort of political business cycle to explain their sometimes large budget deficits, even on current expenditures.
Empirical testing is undertaken using annual data for fifty states and ten provinces respectively. Tests are performed with panel data, created by pooling data on each state or province. The use of panel data significantly increases the power of the unit root test to reject its null hypothesis. Results clearly reject tax smoothing by state governments, but results cannot reject tax smoothing by provincial governments. Differences in resource mobility is suggested as an explanation for the differences in tax smoothing.
Section II looks at the theory of efficient taxation over time. Section III describes the model. Section IV discusses the tax rate data. Sections V and VI present the empirical tests. Section VII summarizes the results.
II. Efficient Taxation over Time
Tax smoothing implies that efficient governments set tax rates today to minimize the cost of intertemporal resource substitution, subject to a long-run balanced budget constraint. Given all available information, the tax rate would be considered as permanent and would not be arbitrarily changed. Only new information about the future path of government spending and output would cause governments to change the tax rate. No prediction could be made of future tax rate changes; therefore, the tax rate would behave as a random walk, and today's tax rate would be the best predictor of future tax rates.
Empirical testing of the tax smoothing hypothesis has focused on federal governments.2 Results of these tests have been mixed. Barro size of each sample is greatly increased, resulting in more efficient estimation and significantly increased power to reject the null hypothesis.
Benjamin and Kochin [4; 5] suggest the ability of efficient governments to smooth tax rates may be restricted at the state and local levels. Mobility of taxable resources may prevent state and local governments from tax smoothing. As temporary deficits and surpluses occur, mobile resources could seek out jurisdictions where the current benefits of government spending exceed the current costs. This would limit the ability of efficient state and local governments to smooth tax rates and could explain the large number of balanced budget rules that exist among these governments in the U.S.
The mobility of taxable resources is likely to be less between provinces in Canada than between states in the U.S. for a number of reasons. First, Canada's provinces are generally larger in area than most states. Second, having two official languages, with French being confined largely to Quebec, and to a lesser extent New Brunswick, mobility would be more costly for large segments of the Canadian population. where gt is the permanent expenditures to output ratio of state or province i at time t, and pbt,_ equals debt interest payments net of the real output growth rate times the ratio of outstanding real public debt to real output for state or province i at the end of period t -1. gt is equivalent to an annuity value of present and expected future government spending relative to output, and is similar in structure to a measurement of permanent income.
Equation (3) shows that only the ratio of permanent government spending to output, and the stock of previously outstanding government debt relative to output, will determine the tax rate of state or province i at time t. Temporary changes in spending or output result in a temporary deficit or surplus, with no change in Tt.
Given all information available today about the future path of spending and output, the tax rate rt is expected to remain unchanged. Therefore, today's tax rate is an unbiased predictor of future tax rates. This condition can be described in equation (4) ,it is the tax rate for state or province i at time t. A is the first difference operator. 3 is a parameter used to test the null hypothesis of a unit root. wi and Ti are individual-specific fixed effects. wi is a state or province-specific intercept term equal to one for state or province i, and zero otherwise. rlit is a state or province-specific time trend, where Ti is equal to one for state or province i, and zero otherwise. Tt is a time-specific fixed effect equal to one at time t, and zero otherwise, and would allow for the possibility of a break in the series. Oj is a parameter, and k is the maximum number of lagged values of aTit_.
E AOjAit corrects for serial correlation in eit and is the panel data equivalent of the augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) test described in Said and
Dickey [15] . eit is an error term that is independently and identically distributed across states or provinces and time, with zero mean and finite and nonzero variance, and is independent of wi, rqi, and -t. The test for a nonstationary Tit can be made by estimating equation (8), and checking the null hypothesis that / = 0. The alternative hypothesis of stationarity would be /3 < 0.
7. With a dependent variable of mit in (8), the unit root null hypothesis would be / = 1 and the alternative hypothesis would be / < 1. Tables I  and II. State government results are shown in Table I Table II . Critical values of the t-statistic testing the unit root null hypothesis 3 = 0 are -5.42 and -5.94, at the 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively." Contrary to the state government results, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for provincial governments in any case. Provincial government results support a random walk with drift for Tit, where the drift varies by province and over time. Such a drift could occur if, for example, the marginal cost of tax collection differs by province and changes over time.
VI. Tests For Orthogonality
The random walk implication of tax smoothing implies that changes in Tit are unpredictable from past information. Therefore, predictability of A-Tit rejects tax smoothing. It may also be the case that governments are not tax smoothing but that changes in spending and output, for example, cause Tit to behave as a random walk. Therefore, to further examine the random walk implication, and to test for evidence of an alternative hypothesis, regression of Anit on lagged values of ATit, Agit, and real output growth, Ayit, will be undertaken. 12 Results of estimation are shown in Table III 13. State or province-specific intercept terms were not significant, and were excluded from the results shown in Table III . Whether state or province-specific intercept terms were included or excluded did not affect the results shown in Table III. 14. As of 1987, Arkansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas had biennial budgets with biennial legislative cycles. As such, these states would appear to be limited to making only biennial tax rate changes. To see if inclusion or exclusion of these states makes a difference to the results, tests were undertaken excluding these states from the panel. Results are similar to the full sample results shown above. Tax smoothing is rejected at the same significance levels. Therefore, all fifty states are included in the tests shown above. Another reason for leaving these "biennial" states in the panel is that even these states sometimes make annual budget reviews. Results of testing are available from the author upon request. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that states with annual and biennial budgets be examined separately. Two types of tests were performed to examine the null hypothesis of tax smoothing. First, unit root tests were undertaken in panel data to directly test the random walk implication of tax smoothing. A unit root was rejected for U.S. state tax rates, but could not be rejected for Canadian provincial tax rates. Second, if governments are tax smoothing and tax rates behave as a random walk, then tax rate changes would be unpredictable from past information. The first differenced tax rate was regressed on lagged first differences of the tax rate, the ratio of government spending to output, and real output growth. Past information was found to be significant in predicting state tax rate changes, but not significant in predicting provincial tax rate changes.
Results suggest that state governments do not smooth tax rates, for example, by building up reserves in more prosperous times, but instead adjust spending and tax rates each year or two to balance their budgets. For state governments, business cycles result in changes in tax rates and spending that would be unnecessary if these governments were tax smoothing. Provincial government results support tax smoothing and contribute towards explaining the behavior of provincial government debt. Greater resource mobility between states than provinces was suggested as an explanation for the differences in tax smoothing. 
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